The decision
Does this prior authorization request meet medical policy criteria, and if not, who needs to look at it?
Encode medical policy as rules that approve requests meeting every criterion, and send everything else to clinical review with the criteria already evaluated. Denials stay a clinical decision made by a person, and every determination carries its reasoning.
Does this prior authorization request meet medical policy criteria, and if not, who needs to look at it?
From a provider portal, a fax intake pipeline, or an integration, carrying the codes, the diagnosis, and the supporting documentation.
AI extracts and classifies what the clinical attachments contain and records the result as facts on the request. It reports what the document says, not what should happen.
Each criterion in the policy is an explicit condition. The engine works backwards from the question, evaluating only the criteria that bear on it, and shows which were met and which were not.
A request meeting every criterion is approved automatically, with the criteria and values that satisfied it on the record.
Not-met and partially-met requests route to clinical review with the criteria pre-evaluated, so the reviewer starts from the analysis instead of building it.
Most automation records that a decision happened. This records why it happened, on logic you can prove was in force at the time.
The trace records each criterion that was evaluated and the value it matched, so a determination is a checklist with evidence rather than a conclusion.
When criteria cannot be established, the proof tree names the missing fact. That is what turns a denial-for-insufficient-information into a specific, answerable request to the provider.
Determinations are pinned to the published version. A request decided under last quarter policy is explained by last quarter policy.
Reviewers sign in before they can open a request, so the record carries the identity of the person who decided, the criteria they were shown, the point in the run where they were asked, and the response that came back.
Each publish is signed with RSA-SHA256 and verifiable against a public key, so the criteria in force on a given date can be proven unchanged.
This is the point of the whole design. Automated approval is available for requests that meet policy. Adverse determinations stay with the clinician: the run pauses, the reviewer sees the criteria already evaluated and the documentation behind them, and their decision resumes the run and is recorded as theirs. Review requires signing in, so an adverse determination always carries the name of the clinician who made it.
The boundary is enforced by how the workflow is built, not by a policy document. AI turns text into facts. Rules you wrote decide what those facts mean.
Reviewers stop re-checking requests that meet every criterion and spend their time on the ones that need judgment.
Clear approvals resolve immediately instead of aging in the same queue as complex requests.
Every determination cites the criteria it turned on, so provider appeals get a concrete answer.
A criteria update is authored, tested, approved, and published as a version, with every determination linked to the version that decided it.
What draws scrutiny is automated adverse determination without clinical review. This does the opposite: it automates approval where policy is clearly met and routes everything else to a clinician, with the criteria evaluation on the record either way.
Then the question worth asking them is what a determination shows six months later. If the answer is a status code and a note, you are carrying the risk of a decision you cannot reconstruct.
That is an argument for versioned, testable rules rather than against automation. Criteria are edited in the authoring UI, checked against saved cases, and published behind an approval, with prior versions intact.
Correct, and we say so plainly on our security page rather than burying it. On a dedicated deployment the platform runs inside your own Azure subscription, so this data stays inside a boundary your existing controls already cover. If a signed BAA is a hard requirement today, we are not yet the right fit and we will tell you that up front.
Configure it not to, and that is the intended design. Rules approve or route. Adverse determinations are made by a clinical reviewer through a human approval step. Reviewers authenticate before they can open a request, so their identity is recorded on the determination.
Goal-driven evaluation produces a proof tree naming the fact it could not establish, which becomes a specific request to the provider rather than a generic insufficient-information denial.
Yes. Test cases and the what-if sandbox run a ruleset without side effects, so you can replay historical requests and compare outcomes before anything goes live.
On a dedicated deployment it stays in your own Azure subscription, and paired with Azure OpenAI the model calls stay inside your boundary as well. Read the security page for the specifics before your review.
Pick the decision that costs your team the most time and the most argument. In one working session we will model it, run it against your own examples, and show you the trace it produces. If it is not a fit, we will say so.